The article examines the relationship between the real effects of inflation and its level in countries with frequent episodes of high inflation. The real effects are computed as asymmetric impulse responses of output to inflation separately for the regimes with different signs of the differences between the expected inflation and the predicted output-neutral inflation. It is found that, with the increase in inflation, such effects increase for the regime with the positive sign, relatively to the effects for the regime with the negative sign. It is also shown that this finding is valid for most countries with high inflation episodes, where inflation is greater than 4.8% for at least 25% of quarterly observations. This leads to a simple policy prescription that, in economies with frequent high inflation episodes, anti-inflationary monetary decisions are least damaging for output if undertaken in the periods when the difference between the expected and output-neutral inflation is negative.
I. Introduction 1
Investigation of the nature and strength of the relationship between inflation and the real sphere is, so far, not close to being conclusive. On the theoretical side, there are two main streams of the literature on this topic: (1) following Tobin's (1965) argument that under high inflation wealth is likely to be reallocated from money to physical capital, which stimulates growth, and (2) following Sidrauski (1967) , that the Tobin effect is offset by increased consumption (as holding real balances is costly), creating superneutrality of inflation. Even more pessimistic views have been developed from the early papers by Brock (1974) that endogenous labour supply stimulates a negative inflation-output relationship by reducing the cost of leisure and from Stockman's (1981) 'cash in advance' approach, in which investment transactions becomes more costly under rising inflation and therefore negatively affect output. The empirical findings are mostly on the side of the pessimists. The statement that loosely defined 'high' inflation is bad for growth seems to be widely confirmed, by the comparative survey of early results by Braumann (2000) and also by later findings (see e.g. Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001; Grier and Grier, 2006, Gillman and Harris, 2010 for the developing and transition economies). However, results by Easterly (1996 and indicate that periods of high inflation (albeit, not hyperinflation) were often followed by growth in the long-run. Also, for some Asian countries more recent empirical findings point out at the neutrality of inflation (Kun, 2012) . It is, therefore, quite natural that the empirical literature focuses on finding the threshold above which inflation might be harmful to growth.
Most of the research implicitly assumes that such threshold is common for a relatively large group of countries and applies the cross-sectional or panel data methods in order to identify it (see e.g. Sarel, 1995; Khan and Senhadji; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002; Vaona and Schiavo, 2007; Basco et al., 2009; Bick, 2010; López-Villavincencio and Mignon, 2011; Kremer et al., 2013; Amisano and Fagan, 2013) .
The problem tackled in this article is similar; we aim at identifying a regime in which a positive inflationary shock to inflation contributes to output increase stronger than a shock induced in a different regime. Rather than to evaluate the optimal inflation threshold common for a specific group of countries, we assume, after Fischer and Modigliani (1978) , that the institutional country-specific effects like taxation, financial systems, corruption levels, differences in reporting (resulting in different money illusion effects) etc. are important enough to create individual conditions for the development of inflationary real effects. We conjecture that this is particularly true for countries where the episodes of high inflation are relatively frequent. For these countries we aim at identification of the inflation regimes for which, depending on the magnitude and frequency of high inflation episodes, inflationary shocks might have different real effects. In order to identify such regimes we distinguish between the expected inflation, in the rational expectations sense, and the predicted outputneutral inflation. Then we define the output-active inflation (denoted by OAI further on) as the difference between the expected inflation and the predicted output-neutral inflation. The different forward-looking inflation regimes are identified by the signs of OAI's. The article shows that the cumulative balance of such real effects in different OAI regimes is positively related to the magnitude of inflation in countries that experience periods of high inflation relatively often. This is, in fact, the development of the Hartmann and Roestel (2013) finding that the low inflation countries lose more than the high inflation countries from raising inflation, in terms of output. Our results lead to practical policy prescriptions. If a country experiences high inflation, knowledge of OAI regimes might suggest the best moment for undertaking the anti-inflationary policy which would hurt the real sphere the least.
Analogously, it might also lead to the identification of the conducive moment for output-stimulating decision.
A simple vector autoregressive model (VAR) for inflation and output is applied as the initial device. Using the decomposition of the inflation and output shocks identified from this VAR (see Blanchard and Quah, 1989, Quah and Vahey, 1995) , we compute two ex-ante inflation indicators: expected inflation and output-neutral (predicted) inflation, and, with their use, OAI. Next, we evaluate the cumulative asymmetric impulse responses separately for the periods of positive and negative OAI's and analyse their balance (that is, the difference between the cumulative impulse responses of output to inflationary shocks for these two regimes).
From the initial set of 45 countries, 17 for which the 0.75th quantile of annual inflation is equal to at least 7.5% have been originally selected. These countries are referred to as countries with frequent episodes of high inflation. Later on, the group of countries with high inflation episodes has been gradually enlarged by lowering the 7.5% criterion. For the countries selected, OAI's have been computed, and the asymmetric impulse responses of output to symmetric inflationary shocks evaluated.
Strong positive correlation between the differences in these cumulative impulse responses and the logarithm of the 0.75 th quantile of inflation, measuring the magnitude of high inflation episodes, has been found. This leads to the conclusion that, for a country with a history of high inflation episodes, identification of the forward-looking inflation regimes is relevant for undertaking monetary policy decisions. More precisely, an anti-inflationary decision should be made in the periods where such regime is negative, that is when the expected inflation is below the predicted output-neutral inflation. It is also found that the higher inflation becomes, the stronger is the conclusion above, as reducing the limit of 7.5% for the 0.75 th quantile lowers the correlation strength. Nevertheless, the correlation becomes significant down to the limit of 4.8%.
Further structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 contains the main concepts, definitions, and derivation of OAI for a simple output-inflation vector autoregressive model. Section 3 briefly discusses the data and introduces our selection of countries with high inflation episodes. Further on it outlines results of the impulse response estimation and presents more detailed results for three benchmark countries: 
II. Methodology
The intuition of OAI can be explained by a simple representation of a typical aggregate supply function, supported indirectly or directly, by a plethora of papers from the seminal works of Lucas (1972) and Bull and Frydman (1983) to thoroughly microfounded approaches by Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2011) :
where t y is a measure of output dynamics (net of long-run effects), t π is the headline (observed) inflation and the expected at t-1 output-neutral inflation is n t π .
Evidently: 
so that, interpreting (4), the positive difference between the expected and predicted output-neutral inflations indicates that an increase in output is expected for time t.
This observation gives rise to using this difference as a simple indicator of possible real effects of pro-inflationary and anti-inflationary shocks.
The practical way of computing n t π is illustrated below by the example of a simple two-equation output-inflation vector autoregressive model (VAR). Suppose that such VAR model can be written as
where Since t Z is stationary, its moving average representation is unique and can be recovered by inverting (6) as:
where L is the lag operator, 
Recovering the output-neutral predicted inflation n t π defined by (3) is based on the methodology suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and then modified further by Gartner and Wehinger (1998) and Charemza and Makarova (2006) . Under the assumption of long-run output neutrality of n t π , a stationary process t Z can be decomposed into the unitary innovations given by:
where: 
∑ , that is:
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Matrix (1) Γ can be easily computed as the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of (7) with (9) as:
Then output-neutral component of inflation is recovered by combining (7) with (10) as:
So that, OAI t can be derived as:
Consequently, evaluation of OAI consists of (i) estimation of the VAR model (6) and its moving average representation (7), (ii) computing the expected and output-neutral inflations sing (8) and (11) and (iii) computing OAI from (12).
In order to evaluate the balance of real effects in periods of positive and negative OAI's, asymmetric impulse response analysis has been applied. Impulse response (IR) is defined as a response of one variable to an impulse in another variable (see e.g. Hamilton, 1994; Lütkepohl, 2006) . Under stationarity (data used here are tested positively for stationarity; see Section 3) IR's are time invariant. Let the impulse response ( , )
x IR z h denotes an expected change in x in reaction to the shock z δ of magnitude v in variable z, after h periods (h=1,2,…,H), that is:
and the cumulative impulse response is
In order to distinguish between inflationary shocks in different forward-looking inflation regimes, the periods of positive and negative OAI, defined by (5), we denote 
III. Empirical Results
The main database consists of quarterly data on annual inflation and annual GDP growth for 45 countries, comprising both advanced and developing countries. All of the data were obtained from two main sources: IFS database and the OECD database.
The data end in 2011q4 and the length of the series varies between 124 observations (since 1981q1) for most countries to 60 (for Ireland, since 1997q1 At the initial stage, hypothesis of the stationarity of all the series has been checked.
The GLS-detrended and optimal point unit root tests have been applied (see Ng and Perron, 2001 and Qu, 2007) , allowing for the presence and absence of the structural breaks under the null and alternative (see Carrion-i-Silvestre et al., 2009 ).
(1998) test which tests the I(1) hypothesis against the alternative of I(0) assuming infinite variance of the disturbances has been additionally applied (see Charemza et al., 2005) . Detailed results show the prevalence of the stationarity hypothesis for both inflation and output series; respectively 90% of cases for inflation and 86% for
GDP.
5 There are only two countries for which the null hypothesis of the series being
I (1) is not rejected by all the tests for both inflation and GDP: Chile and Ireland.
Neither of these countries enters the initial FEHI group.
For each country in the database, we have computed OAI using (12). Parameters of the VAR model (6) are estimated by the multivariate least squares method. Summary of estimation results is given in Table 1 . The moving average representation has been obtained from (7) truncating after the 1,000 th elements. The optimal lags of the VARs have been selected by the criterion of the minimum autocorrelation of the residuals.
This deviates somehow from the established tradition of using information criteria (Akaike and Schwartz Bayesian criteria). The reason for this was that for estimation of OAI it is essential to have residuals with a minimum of autocorrelation, as this is a crucial assumption in identifying e t π and n t π from (8) and (11). The optimal lag length under this criterion is usually shorter than that given by the information criteria, which is important for the relatively short series of data we use. More precisely, as the lag selection criterion we have used the maximum p-value of the Hosking (1980) modification of the multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau test, which seems to have better small sample properties than the alternatives (see Hatemi-J, 2004 ; for description see Lütkepohl, 2006) . Tables 2 and 3 contain the results of the evaluation of the cumulative impulse responses from direct projection (Table 2 ) and the orthogonal decomposition (Table 3) .
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE For checking this, the 7.5% high inflation limit for FEHI has been gradually lowered so that the FEHI group incorporates more countries. First, the country with the highest 0.75 th quantile of inflation in the non-FEHI group is included to the FEHI group, then the country with the second highest quantile is added, etc.. For this gradually enlarging group correlation coefficients as in Fig. 3, between IGAIN (2013) finding given in Section 1 that rising inflation in countries with already high inflation is not as bad for output as in countries with low inflation. Our results extend this; it has been shown above that the lower 0.75 th quantile of inflation becomes, the lower is an increase in real gain in periods of high inflation.
IV. Conclusions and Simple Policy Prescriptions
Our results suggest a way of making the most of rising inflation in countries where there are already frequent episodes of high inflation by undertaking anti-inflationary monetary decisions in periods of negative forward-looking inflation regime, when the difference between the expected and predicted output-neutral inflations is negative. Analogously, the output-stimulating policy should have the best effects if undertaken in the reverse situation, when there is a positive difference between the expected inflation and output-neutral inflation. Somewhat more general reflection here, in the mood of Easterly (1996 and , is that high, and even increasing, inflation might not necessarily be bad for growth if the timing of applying the brakes is wise. More importantly, it can facilitate further institutional reforms leading to further recovery (see Drazen and Easterly, 2001; Cavallo and Cavallo, 2010) .
We have identified the following limitation of the proposed approach. Firstly, our findings are valid for most countries with markedly high inflation (over 4.8% in at least every fourth quarter on average) and not for countries with intrinsically lower inflation. Secondly, it is not conclusive whether inflationary shocks in the periods when expected inflation exceeds output neutral inflation increases or decreases output volatility.
The model we use is very simple and with an obvious room for improvement. Output neutral inflation can be computed in a much more sophisticated way from disaggregated components of output and inflation or, as some measures of core inflation are constructed, by identifying price-controlled components in the consumers' price index. If a disaggregated model is used and, presumably, when the assumption of the multivariate normal distribution is relaxed, impulse response analysis and testing can be done more precisely. We are leaving this for further research.
Appendix A. Basic characteristics of the dataset
The dataset consists of data on GDP growth and inflation for 45 INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE 
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Legend: FEHI group is increasing by gradually lowering the 0.75 th percentile from 6.4% to 1.5%. Solid upper line represents the upper critical bound of the correlation coefficient around zero at 1% level of significance, and the lower line at 5% level of significance.
